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I. INTRODUCTION
On a cold January day in 1843 Daniel M'Naghten attempted to assassinate
England's prime minister, Robert Peel, by firing into Peel's carriage. 1 Edward Drum-
mond, Peel's private secretary, who was riding in the carriage at the time, was killed
by mistake.' At the ensuing trial the jury found that M'Naghten suffered from
paranoid delusions, and returned a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity.
3
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr., lying in ambush outside the Wash-
ington Hilton Hotel, fired a series of shots, seriously wounding the President of the
United States and three other persons. 4 Over a year later, after an eight week trial, the
assailant was found not guilty by reason of insanity.5
Separated by over a century, these two events are more than factually similar.
Both spawned intense nationwide debate concerning the insanity defense and its
ramifications. 6 While M'Naghten's Case7 resulted in a standardized insanity test,8
the Hinckley verdict has raised serious questions about the future of the insanity
defense.
Among the recent criticisms of the insanity defense are that "it spurs crime,
frees criminals, relies too much on experts, holds psychiatrists up to ridicule, sends
trouble makers to hospitals and defies definition." 9 Suggestions for reform range
from abolishing the defense to retaining it with minor modifications. 10 Judge Irving
Kaufman, writing in the New York Times, warns against too precipitous a response:
"[W]hatever changes are made should not be the result of an urge to punish a
particular man. The principle behind the insanity defense-that individuals may take
actions for which they cannot justly be held criminally responsible-should not be
abandoned thoughtlessly.""I
Public outcry against the insanity defense, engendered by prominent cases, has
prompted state legislatures to reexamine their laws and to propose reforms for per-
ceived deficiencies. A solution that has gained increasing acceptance is the guilty but
1. Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16, 17.
2. Id.
3. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (1843).
4. N.Y. Times, March 31, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
5. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 16. (Irving Kaufman is a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. His opinion in United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966), established the standard for the insanity
defense in that circuit.)
6. Id. at 16, 17.
7. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
9. The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWswEEK, May 24, 1982, at 56, 56.
10. Reforming the Insanity Defense: Five Views, STATE LErisLATURES, Oct. 1982, at 21, 21-22.
11. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 17.
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mentally ill (GBMI) plea and verdict first enacted by Michigan in 1975.12 Although
other states initially were slow to emulate, within the past two years seven additional
states have enacted GBMI laws' 3 and several others, including Ohio, 14 are consider-
ing similar legislation.
Generally, GBMI provisions offer the jury an additional verdict to supplement
the traditional not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), and guilty find-
ings. When NGRI is pleaded, the jury may find the defendant GBMI instead.' 5 Once
the GBMI verdict is returned, the court must impose "any sentence which could be
imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense.'
6
The defendant may then be given psychiatric treatment, but upon discharge he must
serve the remainder of his sentence.17
Although seemingly an acceptable compromise aimed at those who do not have
sufficient mental disturbance to meet the test of legal insanity and who would other-
wise be found guilty,18 constitutional and practical problems plague GBMI laws. Due
process concerns arise since no hearing is provided to the GBMI defendant on the
issue of present mental health,' 9 and equal protection challenges proceed on the
theory that the GBMI classification is an irrational one.2 ° Commentators have also
foreseen potential violations of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment2 ' and the possibility of misapplication of GBMI by the jury. 22
This Comment will examine the operation, development, and constitutionality
of the insanity defense, the perceived weaknesses of which led directly to the creation
of the GBMI laws. The evolution of the GBMI laws and the concomitant con-
stitutional problems will be discussed in detail, with particular attention to the pro-
posed legislation that would create the verdict in Ohio. Finally, this Comment will
discuss the viability of GBMI generally and alternative solutions to the problems that
the verdict seeks to address.
II. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
A. Operation
Two major goals of any system of criminal law are to define the conduct for
which sanctions will be imposed and to identify the appropriate subjects of those
sanctions. 2 3 At the foundation of the Anglo-American criminal justice system lies the
assumption that man is a responsible creature with a free will.24 This conception
12. MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 1982).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 161-72.
14. S. 13, 115th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1983-1984).
-15. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (West 1982).
16. Id. § 768.36(3).
17. Id.
18. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DicK. L. REv. 289, 319
(1981).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 176-87.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 188-205.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 206-16.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 217-27.
23. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 853 (1963).
24. Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RuTroEPS L. REv. 719, 725 (1973).
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requires that an offense include both an element of criminal intent or "guilty mind"
(mens rea) and an act or omission (actus reus).25 The insanity defense is based on the
theory that a finding of insanity implies the nonexistence of the requisite criminal
intent.2 6 A person whose mental condition prevents the formation of intent generally
is not held criminally responsible for his actions. 27
1. Burden of Proof
The law creates a presumption of legal sanity at trial. 28 To rebut this presump-
tion and to bring sanity into issue, the defendant has the burden of producing either
some evidence of legal insanity or enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt,
depending on the jurisdiction. 29 Once the burden of going forward has been met,
courts must address the procedural question of which party should bear the burden of
persuasion.
Early common law required the defendant to prove his insanity to the trier of fact
to avoid criminal responsibility. 30 This is the current rule in England. 31 The de-
fendant carried the burden of persuasion in most of the states until 1895, when the
Supreme Court held in Davis v. United States32 that the prosecution carries this
burden in federal cases. 3 3 The issue of whether states would also have to place the
burden of persuasion on the prosecution arose in Leland v. Oregon.34 The United
States Supreme Court held the Oregon statute, which placed the burden of proving
insanity on the defendant, constitutional.35
The vitality of the Leland holding became doubtful after the Supreme Court's
decisions in In Re Winship36 and Mullaney v. Wilbur.37 The Court held in Winship
that due process requires the prosecution to prove every element of a crime beyond a
25. The behavioral position, on the other hand, considers only whether the defendant committed the physical act.
After conviction, mens rea is considered by a panel of experts in determining disposition. Id. at 733. See generally H.
PAcKER, THE LtMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANcnoN 11-15 (1968); B. Woo-rTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 58-84
(1963).
26. See, e.g., Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 U. DE. J. URB. L.
471, 472 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill]; Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally
Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351, 351 (1979).
27. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRI NtAL Aw § 36, at 271-72 (1972). The authors discuss the
six theories of criminal punishment and explain why they are considered inapplicable to the insane. (1) Prevention-
ineffective since the insane are unlikely to recognize the significance of sanction; (2) Restraint-provided by the insanity
defense; (3) Rehabilitation--the insane are believed to require unique treatment and the insanity defense already diverts
the insane person to a mental hospital; (4) Deterrence-the general public would not be deterred by observing the
punishment of the insane since it does not identify with the offender, (5) Education--the insanity defense is most
frequently interposed for inherently bad crimes for which there is no need to educate; and (6) Retribution-it is believed
that those who are not morally culpable should not be punished. Id.
28. Id. § 40, at 312.
29. Id. § 40, at 313.
30. See, e.g., Note, Stopping the Revolving Door: Adopting a Rational System for the Insanity Defense, 8 HoFSTRA
L. REv. 973, 982 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Revolving Door].
31. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 796-97 (1952) (discussing the origins of statutes allocating the burden of
proof).
32. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
33. Id. at 485.
34. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
35. Id. at 799.
36. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
37. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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reasonable doubt.38 In Mullaney the Court struck down a Maine statute that defined
murder to include an element of malice aforethought. To reduce a murder charge to
one of manslaughter the statute required the defendant to rebut a presumption of
malice by proving that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. The
Court, in applying the Winship holding, found that due process requires the prosecu-
tion to prove the absence of heat of passion and that states could not undermine
Winship by redefining elements of a crime, characterizing them only as factors
bearing on the extent of punishment. 39 The requirement that each element be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt logically applies to the insanity defense as well. No
distinction between sanity and mens rea that would justify excluding sanity from
those elements that the prosecution has the constitutional burden of proving has ever
been adequately articulated. 4° Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has refused to ex-
plicitly overrule Leland. In Patterson v. New York,4 1 the Leland holding was reaf-
firmed in a decision that marked a substantial retreat from the Winship and Mullaney
doctrine. 4
2
Several commentators have argued persuasively that states should again place
this burderi on the defendant. 43 A prosecution's inability to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt may result merely from the speculative nature of expert
testimony.' Placing the burden on the defendant would also remove some in-
consistency between the trial and commitment hearings, in which the prosecution has
the burden of proving that a NGRI acquittee is mentally ill.4 5 A procedural imperfec-
tion presently exists because a NGRI acquittee may be released when the prosecution
fails to prove the defendant sane by a reasonable doubt at trial and then fails to show
at a post-trial hearing that the defendant is sufficiently mentally ill to require com-
mitment.46
2. Acquittal and Commitment
When a NGRI verdict is returned, a defendant is subject to a civil commitment
hearing rather than being released as with other defenses. 47 Prior to 1960 insanity
acquittees could be automatically committed as a preventive measure for the protec-
tion of society without further hearings on the issue of present sanity.48 As the civilly
38. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
39. 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975).
40. Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 989.
41. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
42. A New York statute that required the defendant to prove extreme emotional distress was upheld. The Supreme
Court distinguished Mullaney and limited it to cases in which malice or lack of provocation is included within a statutory
definition of the crime. Id. at 215-16.
43. See, e.g., Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197 (1983); Kaufman, supra
note 1, at 20; Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 982-92.
44. Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 989.
45. Id. at 990-91.
46. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 20.
47. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scott, supra note 27, § 36, at 269; H. PACKER, THE LtMrrs OF Tim CRMimNAL
SANU1ION 132 (1968); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "InsanityDefense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 854-59 (1963).
48. Sherman, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Retreat from the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 237, 242 (1981).
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committed gained more rights, courts began to subject the procedures governing
NGRI acquittees to due process and equal protection scrutiny. In Bolton v. Harris49
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals determined that no presumption
could be drawn regarding a NGRI acquittee's continuing insanity and that due pro-
cess required that a hearing be held on the issue. Temporary detention was permitted,
however, for purposes of examination. 50 Equal protection concerns were also im-
plicated because neither the civilly committed nor the NGRI acquittee had been
convicted of a crime. 51 Since the two classes are similarly situated, they should be
treated with substantial equality. Today, regarding both treatment and release pro-
cedures, the trend is toward greater equality between the two groups.5 2
B. History and Development
The insanity defense is not a standardized formula, but one that varies by
jurisdiction. Four basic approaches have been employed by the courts: the M'Naght-
en rule,5 3 the irresistible impulse test,54 the Durham test,55 and the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code formula. 56 All but the Durham test are currently used in
the United States.5 7 Understanding the purpose of the GBMI verdict and its place
within the structure of criminal law requires an examination of the evolution and
particularly the weaknesses of the insanity tests.
1. Pre-M'Naghten
Insanity has not always been a defense for criminal responsibility. 5 8 The first use
of insanity to excuse criminal conduct appeared in the thirteenth century in the form
of pardons. 5 9 Not until the fourteenth century did absolute madness become a com-
plete defense to a crime. 60
In these early years insanity was not a well-understood phenomenon. The initial
rules were largely a fusion of various commentators' views. 61 Bracton, writing in the
thirteenth century, was one of the earliest legal commentators to consider insanity.62
49. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
50. Id. at 651.
51. Id. at 650.
52. Sherman, supra note 48, at 250.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 95-105.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
57. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 526, 530 (1981).
58. R. PERuNs & R. BoycE, CRIMINAL LAw 950 (3d ed. 1982).
59. See generally S. GLuEC~r, MENTAL DisoRDER AND THE CRIMtNAL LAw 123-460 (1925) (early history of legal
tests for excusing criminal responsibility); R. PERKUNs & R. BoYcE, CUMINAL LAW 950 (3d ed. 1982); Gray, The
Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary Relevance, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 559, 559-65 (1972).
These pardons were issued regularly by the time of Edward 1 (1272-1307); during Edward II's reign (1307-1327) insanity
was recognized as a defense, although chattels were still forfeited. R. PEwRKNS & R. BoycE, CRitiNAL LAw 950 (3d ed.
1982).
60. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 125. This occurred during the reign of Edward Ill (1327-1377). Id.
61. See, e.g., id. at 123-60; Lewinstein, The Historical Development of Insaniy as a Defense in Criminal Actions
(pt. 1), 14 J. FO.ENsIc Sa. 275, 276-80 (1969).
62. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 126.
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He defined a madman as "one who does not know what he is doing, . . . who lacks
in mind and reason, and who is not far removed from the brutes." 63 This definition
contains rudiments of two of the tests later utilized-the "right-wrong" 64 and "wild
beast" tests.
65
Writing in the sixteenth century, Fitzherbert defined an idiot as "such a person
who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who was his father or
mother, nor how old he is." 66 A century later, Coke introduced the concept of intent
and purpose,67 which Lord Hale, too, adopted, but with the reservation that criminal
intent was negated only by total, not partial, insanity.68 He utilized the mental
capabilities of a fourteen-year-old as the standard for his test.69 The eighteenth
century brought Hawkins' "good-and-evil" test, that was to be a forerunner of the
"right-wrong" test.7 °
The early case law dealing with insanity cannot be characterized as an integrated
exposition of the law, but rather as the product of isolated thrusts at the problem.
Arnold's Case7' marked the judicial origin of the "wild beast" test: one who has no
more mental capacity than a beast is not criminally responsible. 72 Earl Ferrers"
Case,7 3 used the "right-wrong" test and construed Hale's doctrine to mean that only
one totally deprived of reason could be found not criminally responsible.74 Delusion
as a test for criminal responsibility was introduced in Hadfield's Case75 by Lord
Erskine. As one commentator cogently remarks, "[The] process of seizing upon
incidental, or at the most, partial, statements of predecessors and adhering to them
with uncritical dogmatism has marked the legal history of the subject to this day.' -76
2. M'Naghten or "Right-Wrong" Test
When Daniel M'Naghten was tried after attempting to assassinate the British
prime minister, a verdict of not guilty on the ground of insanity was returned. 77 It was
found at trial that the defendant suffered from acute paranoia and delusions. The
resultant public outrage served as an impetus for discussion in the House of Lords and
63. Id. (citing 1 WHARTON & STu.d, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 510 (1878)).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 77-87.
65. See infra text accompanying note 72.
66. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 128 (citing I W. HAWKINS, PLEAS or THE CROWN 2 (Ist ed. 1716)).
67. Lewinstein (pt. 1), supra note 61, at 276.
68. Id. at 276-77.
69. Id. at 277. Hale stated, "[S]uch a person as labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily as great
understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason, or felony." Id. (citing 1
M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29 (1778)).
70. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 137-38. "Those who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between good
and evil, as infants under the age of discretion, ideots, and lunaticks, are not punishable by any criminal prosecution
whatsoever." Id. at 138 (citing W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 1-2 (lst ed. 1716)).
71. Rex v. Arnold, 16 Howell's State Trials 695 (1724).
72. Id. at 764-65. Judge Tracy, in his charge to the jury, stated, -"[it must be a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast,
such a one is never the object of punishment." Id. at 765.
73. 19 Howell's State Trials 885 (1760).
74. Lewinstein (pt. 1), supra note 61, at 278.
75. 27 Howell's State Trials 1281 (1800).
76. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 141.
77. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
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the decision to ask fifteen common-law judges for an opinion on the law governing
such cases.78 The judges' responses became the basis for the test of insanity used in
England and America for almost one hundred years.
79
The standard "right-wrong" test adopted in M'Naghten appears in the answer to
the second and third questions asked of the judges. 80
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and
to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
8
'
This rule, while once widely accepted, has been the subject of a great deal of
controversy. Critics argue that the language of the test, particularly words like
"knowledge" and "wrong," is vague and ambiguous. 82 They also claim that the test
restricts expert testimony, but this charge is largely unsubstantiated.8 3 Probably the
most frequent criticism characterizes the test as based on an obsolete conception of
the nature of insanity because it emphasizes only the individual's cognition and
ignores volitional elements.
84
These defects are not inherent in the M'Naghten test. It has been more rigidly
and narrowly construed than necessary.85 The judges in the original case provided
latitude for modification as the "circumstances of each particular case may
require.",8 6 In practice, however, the rule became a "rigid codification of early
examples of its application . . . [when] . . . the combination of increased knowl-
edge and open-minded interpretation could have made M'Naghten an effective insan-
ity test. ' 8
7
3. Irresistible Impulse Test
Dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten test's exclusive emphasis on the cognitive
element led to the creation of the irresistible impulse test. The creators of the test
78. Lewinstein (pt. I), supra note 61, at 281.
79. Gray, supra note 59, at 567. See generally Hovenkamp, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility in Progressive
America, 57 N.D.L. R v. 541,544-51 (1981), for a discussion of the psychological theories prevailing at the time of the
case. Hovenkamp examines the attitudes that contributed to the creation of the insanity tests.
80. S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 178. The questions were as follows:
2d. What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted with
insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, is charged with the commission of a crime
(murder, for example), and insanity is set up as a defence?
3d. In what terms ought the question to be left to the jury, as to the prisoner's state of mind at the time when
the act was committed?
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 720 (1843).
81. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) (emphasis added).
82. See, e.g., Lewinstein (pt. 1), supra note 61, at 283.
83. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, § 37, at 282.
84. See, e.g., id., at 280; Lewinstein (pt. 1), supra note 61, at 283; Comment, Insanity--Guilty But Mentally
ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PR¢c. & PRoc. 351, 359 (1979).
85. See S. GLUECK, supra note 59, at 185; Gray, supra note 59, at 572-76.
86. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 723 (1843).
87. Gray, supra note 59, at 567.
1983]
804 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:797
believed that the effect of insanity on emotions and will power should also be
considered.
88
The volitional theory was first mentioned in State v. Thompson,89 an 1834
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court. The court considered the power to choose to do
or not to do an act a necessary element for conviction. 9' However, the leading
judicial exposition of the irresistible impulse test appeared later in Parsons v. State.91
Judge Somerville maintained that freedom of will and the capacity to intellectually
discriminate, must both be elements of legal responsibility. 92 Subsequently, the
additional element identified in Parsons was added to the M'Naghten test in many
American states, although it never became the law in England. 93 Commentators have
found this test too restrictive because it fails to take into account those mental
illnesses characterized by brooding and reflection.
94
4. Durham or Product Test
Discontent with the M'Naghten rule continued even after it was supplemented
with the irresistible impulse test. Largely influenced by the ideas contained in Dr.
Ray's Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity,95 Judge Charles Doe established a product
test in the New Hampshire case of State v. Pike.96 Doe believed that M'Naghten was
outdated even before it was formulated. "The law does not change with every
advance of science; nor does it maintain a fantastic consistency by adhering to
medical mistakes which science has corrected."-
97
The test elucidated in State v. Pike was not emulated by other courts until the
decision of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in Durham v. United
States.98 The court's holding that "an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect" 99 is basically a
reformulation of the New Hampshire test, with one crucial difference. The New
Hampshire rule is an evidentiary rule while that of Durham is a substantive rule of
88. See, e.g., Lewinstein, The Historical Development of Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Actions (pt. 2), 14 J.
FotRmsc Sci. 469, 469 (1969).
89. Wright's Ohio Rep. 617 (1834).
90. Id. at 622.
91. 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
92. Id. at 585, 2 So. at 859.
93. Lewinstein (pt. 2), supra note 88, at 476-77. Today only five states-Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, New Mexico,
and Virginia-still adhere to the test. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 526, 534-35 (1981).
94. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, § 37, at 284-85.
95. Lewinstein (pt. 2), supra note 88, at 481.
96. 49 N.H. 399 (1869). Judge Doe stated the rule in his opinion thus:
The principles of the law were maintained at the trial of the present case, when, experts having testified as usual
that neither knowledge nor delusion is the test, the court instructed the jury that all tests of mental disease are
purely matters of fact, and that if the homicide was the offspring or product of mental disease in the defendant,
he was not guilty by reason of insanity.
Id. at 442.
97. Id. at 438.
98. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
99. Id. at 874-75.
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law. 10 0 In a few short years, the Durham rule hardened and left little latitude for new
medical discoveries. 1 1
Soon the inherent difficulties of the Durham test were revealed. Its terms were
ambiguous and, because of the lack of standard definitions for "mental disease" and
"mental defect," juries were forced to rely too greatly on expert psychiatric
testimony. 102 In McDonald v. United States1°3 the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals attempted to alleviate this problem by enlarging the definitions, but
problems with ambiguity and the concept of causal connection persisted. Finally, in
United States v. Brawner,104 eighteen years after first adopting the product test, the
Court of Appeals abandoned it. Today Durham is no longer followed anywhere in the
United States, although New Hampshire still adheres to its unique product test. 105
5. ALI Model Penal Code Test
In 1953 the American Law Institute (ALI) commenced a study of the problems
entailed in determining criminal responsibility. 10 6 Its solution is embodied in section
4.01 of the Model Penal Code, which the ALI officially adopted in 1962. Section
4.01 states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law.
(2) As used in the Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."' 7
In formulating this test, the ALI took the view that both impairment of volitional
capacity and cognition must be considered. 108 Thus, the Model Penal Code test is
similar to the M'Naghten rule supplemented by the irresistible impulse test, without
either test's historical inadequacies. The ALI test differs from M'Naghten in that it
calls for "substantial" rather than complete impairment. The drafters recognized the
absence of absolutes and allowed more leeway for psychiatric testimony. 10 9 The
Model Penal Code test also takes into account actions accompanied by brooding and
reflection. 11o The drafters totally rejected the Durham test, because of its difficulties
and the ambiguity of the word "product." 1 1 '
100. Gray, supra note 59, at 570.
101. Id. at 571.
102. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 27, § 38, at 291; Lewinstein (pt. 2), supra note 88, at 484.
103. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
104. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
105. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 526, 530, 535 (1981).
106. Lewinstein (pt. 2), supra note 88, at 490.
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
108. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment at 157 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
109. Id. at 158.
110. Id. at 157.
!11. Id. at 159.
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Today a majority of states has accepted the Model Penal Code provision either
as drafted or with minor changes. 112 With one exception, the federal circuits have
now adopted the test in some form." 3 As one court has noted, "[t]he ALI rule is
eclectic in spirit, partaking of the moral focus of M'Naghten, [and] the practical
accomodation of the 'control rules.'- 114 For these reasons this alternative has won
general acceptance.
C. Constitutionality
The insanity defense has a long history as part of the jurisprudence of England
and America." 5 Still, the question of whether the United States Constitution man-
dates the defense has not been definitively answered, for the Supreme Court has
never directly considered the issue."16
State courts, 117 however, have found the defense constitutionally required by the
due process clause,118 the right to a trial by jury,1 9 and the prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 120 In State v. Strasburg12 ' the Washington Supreme Court,
noting that the defense, while not specifically mentioned, was in full force when the
state constitution was adopted,122 determined that the right to a trial by jury embraced
the right to have a jury pass on every substantive fact of the alleged crime,
including the sanity of the accused.123 The tribunal concluded, "[The statute] has the
effect of depriving the appellant of liberty without due process of law, especially in
that it deprives him of the right of trial by jury; and is therefore unconstitutional." 12 4
More recently, in State ex rel. Boyd v. Green125 the Florida Supreme Court held
that a statutory bifurcated trial proceeding requiring separate trials on the issue of
guilt and of insanity violated due process. No evidence of insanity could be admitted
until guilt or innocence was determined. The court believed that this statute "raise[d]
112. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 526, 530 (1981).
113. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961);
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Frazier, 458 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); Wion v. United States, 325
F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The Ist Circuit has had no recent opportunity to address this issue. Annot., 56 A.L.R. FED. 326 (1982).
114. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 53-114.
116. See, e.g., Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen., No. 236, slip op. (Aug. 25, 1982). In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952), the Supreme Court held that states are not constitutionally required to adopt a particular insanity defense, but did
not address the issue of whether the defense itself was required. Id. at 800-01.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 118-28.
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law."
119. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
120. U.S. CONsr. amend. VIII (as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
121. 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). The Washington Supreme Court analyzed the state constitution which
contained a due process provision substantially similar to that in the federal constitution.
122. Id. at 115, 110 P. at 1022.
123. Id. at 118-19, 110 P. at 1023-24.
124. Id. at 123-24, 110 P. at 1025.
125. 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978).
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an irrebuttable presumption of intent which is contrary to... due process of
law." ' 126 The element of intent became irrebuttable because the defendant was not
allowed to introduce evidence regarding his mental state at the stage of the trial
designed to determine guilt.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Sinclair v. State127 held that the
elimination of the insanity defense violated due process and also constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, which is prohibited by the eighth amendment as applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. Justice Ethridge reasoned that "it
is . . . shocking and inhuman to punish a person for an act when he doesn't have the
capacity to know the act or judge its consequences." 128
The United States Supreme Court indicated in Trop v. Dulles129 that the eighth
amendment is not a fixed and rigid standard. Chief Justice Warren stated that "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." 130 Subsequently, the Court indicated that the
infliction of criminal penalties for a status is contrary to the eighth amendment,131
and in Powell v. Texas132 five justices concluded that the amendment might also be
violated if criminal sanctions are imposed for criminal conduct that the defendant is
powerless to avoid. 133 Thus, it seems possible that the Supreme Court would also
find the abolition of the insanity defense unconstitutional on these grounds. 1
34
Two states, Montana135 and Idaho,1 36 have ostensibly eliminated the insanity
defense. Their statutes differ markedly, however, from those found unconstitutional.
Unlike the statutes in Strasburg and Sinclair, those of Montana and Idaho provide for
the admission of evidence and a full hearing on the issue of mens rea. 137 Broadly
interpreted, these provisions greatly resemble the insanity defense.13 8 Perhaps the
only significant difference is that a defendant must show that he was incapable of
forming the particular mental element required by statute for an offense, rather than
that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his con-
duct. 139 The result of the Montana and Idaho laws is similar to a verdict of NGRI for,
126. Id. at 794.
127. 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931). The court analyzed the state constitution which contained a due process
provision substantially similar to that in the federal constitution.
128. Id. at 159, 132 So. at 584 (Ethridge, J., specially concurring).
129. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
130. Id. at 101.
131. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute that made the
"status" of narcotics addiction a criminal offense. Id. at 667.
132. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
133. Id. This is the opinion of the four dissenters and Justice White, who concurred in the result, but not the
reasoning, of the case.
134. Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen., No. 236, slip op. (Aug. 25, 1982).
135. MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-101 to -102 (1981).
136. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1982).
137. Id. § 18-207(c); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (1981).
138. Insanity Defense Barred in Idaho, 68 A.B.A. J. 531, 531 (1982).
139. Diroll, Insanity Plea Alternatives: A Cursory Review of Other States' Laws (July 22, 1982) (Ohio Legislative
Service Commission).
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if a jury finds no mens rea when mental state is in issue, the defendant may be
involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility after a hearing on his mental com-
petence. 14
0
I. GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL
The insanity plea has been attacked in recent years by the public because of the
perception that too many defendants are feigning mental illness and that those acquit-
ted spend too little time in mental institutions. 141 This is, to a large degree, a
misconception. Only one-half of one percent or less of all felony defendants are
found NGRI. 142 Of those, between seven and ten percent commit another offense,
compared with between thirty-five and eighty percent of other prisoners.' 43 The
perceived need for greater control over insanity acquittees has engendered several
options, one of which is the GBMI plea and verdict.
A. History
The guilty but mentally ill laws were created by the Michigan legislature in 1975
as a response to intense public pressure.144 They have served as the prototype for
other states enacting similar legislation. 1
45
In 1974 the Michigan Supreme Court held in People v. McQuillan146 that auto-
matic commitment for NGRI acquittees was unconstitutional. It cited Bolton v.
Harris147 and Baxstrom v. Herold 48 as precedent and determined that a presumption
of continuing insanity was not justified. "[D]ue Process requires that [the] defendant
140. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301 (1981); Reforming the Insanity Defense: Five Views, STATE LEGISLATURES,
Oct. 1982, at 21, 24 (Kenneth McClure, Idaho Deputy Attorney General).
This result is different from that advocated by the legal commentators favoring abolition. One of the abolitionists'
chief criticisms of the insanity defense is that it results in commitment instead of release when asserted successfully.
Logically, when an element, e.g., mens rea, cannot be proved, a defendant should be found not guilty. Abolitionists see
the defense as merely a tool to gain social control over the insane without squarely facing the moral implications. They
urge lawmakers to directly address these concerns. See Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the 'Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72
YALE L.J. 853 (1963). See also T. SzAsz, LAw, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 138-46 (1963); B. Woo-roN, CRIME AND
THE CPIMINAL LAw 58-84 (1963).
Opponents of the abolitionist position believe the insanity defense serves an important function as a symbol of the
free will model of criminal responsibility. According to their views, if the defense is abolished, social dangerousness will
be substituted for moral guilt as the basis for criminal sanctions. This would change the emphasis of the law to a
behavioralist position-the trial court would consider only whether an act was committed, and insanity would be
considered at the dispositive stage by a panel of experts. Opponents believe this change would create too great a potential
for abuse. See Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?--Not Yet, 26 RtrroE.s L. REv. 719 (1973); see also H.
FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANTY 1-15 (1972); Brady, Abolish the Insanity Defense-No!, 8 Hous. L.
REv. 629 (1971).
141. See generally Sherman, supra note 48, at 237-38.
142. Breo & Stacey, Was Hinckley Insane?, Am. Med. News, July 9, 1982, at 1, 15, col. 1, 2 (quoting Jonas
Rappeport, M.D., expert witness for the prosecution in the Hinckley trial).
143. Id. at 15, col. 1. The wide percentage spread is explained by variations in method of count, jurisdiction, or
other factors. Id.
144. See Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 26, at 479-83 for a description of events leading to the
enactment of the Michigan GBMI laws.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 161-72.
146. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
147. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
148. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
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be given a sanity hearing to determine present mental condition and equal protection
requires that the hearing be substantially similar to other commitment pro-
ceedings ... "149 A reasonable period of temporary detention was permitted for
purposes of examination.' 50
Under Michigan law a defendant must be released absent a determination that he
is mentally ill and dangerous. 15 1 In practice this means that once the defendant's
overt symptoms are brought under control by drugs, the Department of Mental Health
no longer considers him mentally ill for purposes of continued hospitalization, and he
must be discharged since commitment is no longer automatic.' 52 Less than a year
after the McQuillan decision, sixty-four inmates were released.153 Within another
year two of them had committed well-publicized violent crimes. 154 The GBMI pro-
visions were the direct outgrowth of the intense public reaction. 1
55
B. Operation
1. Michigan
Once a defendant asserts the defense of insanity, a judge or jury may find him
GBMI instead. The Michigan provision states that:
[Tihe defendant may be found "guilty but mentally ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds
all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that
offense. 156
This law adds the verdict to Michigan's more traditional guilty, not guilty, and not
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts. It is aimed at those persons who do not demon-
strate sufficient mental disturbance to meet the test of legal insanity and who would
otherwise be found guilty.
Once the GBMI verdict is returned, "the court shall impose any sentence which
could be imposed pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same
offense." '' After the defendant is committed to the custody of the Department of
Corrections, he must undergo further evaluations. The treatment indicated may be
given either by the Department of Corrections or the Department of Mental Health. If
149. People v. MeQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 537, 221 N.W.2d 569, 581 (1974).
150. Id.
151. Brown & Witmer, Criminal Lmv. 1978 Annual Survey ofMichigan Law, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 335, 356(1978).
152. Id.
153. Comment, Guilty But Mentally 1ll, supra note 26, at 471.
154. See Brown & Wittner, supra note 151, at 356-57; Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 26, at 471-72.
John McGee, who claimed to have committed over twenty-five murders, and Ronald Manlen were both committed to
mental institutions after receiving verdicts of NGRI. They were released as no longer mentally ill and dangerous following
McQuillan. Shortly after release, McGee kicked his wife to death, and Manlen raped two women. Brown & Wittner,
supra note 151, at 356-57.
155. Brown & Wittner, supra note 151, at 357-59.
156. Micrt. Co?". LAws ANN. § 768.36(1) (West 1982).
157. Id. § 768.36(3).
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the defendant is discharged from the latter facility, he will be returned to the Depart-
ment of Corrections for the balance of his sentence.
158
The statute provides for both a plea and a verdict of GBMI. The judge may not
accept the plea, however, until he has examined psychiatric reports, held a hearing on
the issue of the defendant's mental illness, and determined that the defendant was
mentally ill at the time of the offense.15 9 Finally, the statute outlines probation
procedures for the GBMI defendant. Treatment is a condition of probation, and
failure to continue treatment constitutes a violation of probation. The probation
period is for a minimum of five years and will not be shortened without the considera-
tion of psychiatric reports by the sentencing court.
160
2. Other States
Michigan remained the sole proponent of the GBMI plea and verdict for six
years, but recently seven additional state legislatures have enacted similar laws.
161
The trend toward broadening the base of criminal responsibility is reflected in the
statement of the sponsor of the Illinois law:
There are two schools of psychiatric thought. One doesn't agree with me. The other says,
"When you have someone who does a horrible crime and pleads not guilty by reason of
insanity and is found guilty but mentally ill, he should be held accountable because
accountability is therapy." Not only is it therapy, but it is justice. 162
The new state statutes retain most of the fundamental aspects of the Michigan
GBMI law.' 63 The insanity defense is preserved, but a defendant asserting it may be
found GBMI. Also, the sentence imposed by the court must be identical to that which
could be imposed for a guilty verdict.
The most fundamental discrepancy between the Michigan laws and those of
other states appears in the legal definition of insanity. Since a defendant may be
found GBMI only if he is not legally insane, the definition of insanity used in each
jurisdiction has broad ramifications for the scope of the GBMI verdict. Michigan,
Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky use either the Model Penal Code test or a variation.164
Georgia and New Mexico retain the M'Naghten test, modified by the irresistible
impulse standard. 165 When Delaware enacted GBMI, it narrowed the insanity test
158. Id.
159. Id. § 768.36(2).
160. Id. § 768.36(4).
161. ALAsKA STAT. §§ 12.47.030-.050 (Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. xi, §§ 408-409 (Supp. 1982); GA.
CoDE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 113-4, 115-1 to-4, 1005-2-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1982); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-35-1-1 to -4, 35-35-2-1, 35-36-2-5 (Bums Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
504.120-150 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-9-3 to -4 (Supp. 1982).
162. Reforming the Insanity Defense: Five Views, STATE LEGISLATuPES, Oct. 1982, at 21, 24 (Senator Adeline
Geo-Karis).
163. Diroll, Insanity Plea Alternatives: A Cursory Review of Other States' Laws (July 22, 1982) (Ohio Legislative
Service Commission).
164. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-6(a) (Bums 1979); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 504.060 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); Micn. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.21a (West 1982).
165. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-2 to -3 (1982); State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954).
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from the Model Penal Code to the M'Naghten test,1 66 and consequently expanded the
number of people who may be found GBMI. Alaska, though, has made the most
radical change:' 67 it finds a defendant insane only when he is "unable, as a result of a
mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of [his] conduct."' 168
The Alaska standard is even narrower than the M'Naghten test, which also excused
criminal responsibility when the defendant knew the nature of the act, but did not
appreciate its wrongfulness.1 69 Thus, only one prong of the traditional M'Naghten
test exculpates the defendant. Alaska specifically requires a jury to return a finding of
GBMI when the Model Penal Code standard of legal insanity is met. 170 In effect, the
law requires conviction of all but those who suffer from the most extreme forms of
mental illness, such as the man who believes he is squeezing lemons when he
strangles his wife. 17' This approach is particularly subject to constitutional attack. It
narrows legal insanity almost to the point of nonexistence and may unconstitutionally
deprive defendants of the insanity defense. 172
C. Constitutional Problems
Commentators have attacked the GBMI verdict and plea on a variety of con-
stitutional grounds. 173 These include charges that the verdict and plea violate due
process, equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment,
and that the misapplication of the verdict and plea effectively abolishes the insanity
defense.174 Thus far, however, the courts have upheld the statutes. 175
1. Due Process
Due process has served as the basis for one of the strongest constitutional
assaults on GBMI. Under the holding in People v. McQuillan176 insanity acquittees
are entitled to a hearing to determine present mental health since institutionalization
would represent a significant restriction on a defendant's liberty interest, 177 but the
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. xi, § 401(a) (Supp. 1982). See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 526 (1981) for previous tests. See
Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 195-97 (1983), for a favorable view of this change.
167. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Supp. 1982). Alaska, prior to GBMI, used the Model Penal Code test. Annot., 9
A.L.R. 4th 526, 536 (1981).
168. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Supp. 1982).
169. See supra text accompanying note 81.
170. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.030 (Supp. 1982).
171. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 commentary at 156 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
172. See infra text accompanying notes 217-27.
173. See Sherman, supra note 48, at 256-60; Comment, Guilty But Menially Ill, supra note 26, at 489-96;
Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188, 191-95
(1978); Comment, Criminal Responsibility: Changes in the Insanity Defense and the "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Response,
21 WASHBURN L.J. 515, 546-51 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Criminal Responsibility]; Comment, Insanit -
Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 351,
369-76 (1979).
174. See infra text accompanying notes 176-227.
175. Michigan decisions are emphasized because that state has had GBMI for eight years. while other states have
enacted GBMI laws too recently to have generated much case law to date.
176. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
177. Id. at 536, 221 N.W.2d at 580.
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Michigan GBMI statute makes no provision for a hearing in the case of the GBMI
defendant.
In People v. McLeod178 the Michigan Supreme Court held that a sentencing
court must obtain a psychiatric report evaluating a defendant's present mental health
prior to sentencing,' 7 9 but specifically determined that due process did not require a
hearing. '80 The court reasoned that the GBMI defendant was situated differently than
the NGRI acquittee and concluded that the GBMI defendant "no longer [had] a right
to unfettered liberty"' 181 since he had been found guilty.
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Vitek v. Jones182 puts the
above result into question. In Vitek a Nebraska statute dealing with the involuntary
transfer of a state prisoner to a mental hospital was held to implicate liberty interests
protected by the due process clause.'8 3 Loss of liberty was characterized by the court
as involving "more than a loss of freedom from confinement." 184 "[T]he stigmatiz-
ing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for involuntary psychiatric treat-
ment, coupled with the subjection of the prisoner to mandatory behavior modification
as a treatment for mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that
requires procedural protections." 8 5 The Court held that a hearing on the prisoner's
mental state was an integral part of those protections. '8 6 Although arguably GBMI
defendants are in a substantially different position than inmates because of the prior
judicial determination of mental illness,' 8 7 a strong possibility exists that the lack of a
hearing may be sufficient to trigger due process problems.
2. Equal Protection
Courts have also been confronted with, and have rejected, equal protection
challenges to GBMI.' 88 Opponents regard the classification of GBMI as irrational
and any disparate treatment based on that classification as violating the equal protec-
tion clause.' 8 9 In People v. McLeod'90 the defendant argued that the minimum
probation period of five years violated equal protection because other persons con-
victed of the same crimes faced no equivalent minimal term. 19' For purposes of equal
protection a classification is acceptable if it rationally furthers the object of the
178. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
179. Id. at 658, 288 N.W.2d at 917.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 659, 288 N.W.2d at 917.
182. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
183. Id. at 494.
184. Id. at 492.
185. Id. at 494.
186. Id. at 494-95.
187. Comment, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 173, at 548-49.
188. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, - Ind. - , 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982); People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288
N.W.2d 909 (1980); People v. Rone, 109 Mich. App. 702, 311 N.W.2d 835 (1981); People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App.
351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979); People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978); People v. Darwall, 82 Mich.
App. 652, 267 N.W.2d 472 (1978); People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 263 Nl.W.2d 44 (1977).
189. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 173, at 546.
190. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
191. Id. at 656-57, 288 N.W.2d at 916.
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legislation, unless a classification is inherently suspect or a fundamental interest is
implicated.' 92 Since no evidence of a suspect classification was introduced and no
fundamental interest was infringed, the court concluded that the legislation was
rationally related to the state's purpose of assuring supervised medical treatment for
convicted individuals suffering from mental illness. 193 The Michigan Court of Ap-
peals has also refused to recognize a hearing requirement for a GBMI defendant, even
though a person found guilty of the same offense must be granted a hearing before he
may be subject to involuntary treatment. 194
Challengers of the GBMI verdict have additionally argued that GBMI de-
fendants are in the same position as persons who are mentally ill, but not guilty of an
offense. While mental illness is common to both classes, the added element of guilt is
a major difference that probably can justify the inequality of treatment.' 95
In People v. Sorna196 a third ground for equal protection was invoked-the
classification of GBMI defendants vis-A-vis people found not guilty by reason of
insanity. The defendant argued that the definitions of mental illness and legal insanity
were based on similar behavioral characteristics and, therefore, it was irrational to
find criminal responsibility in one case and not in the other. 197 The Michigan Court of
Appeals held that GBMI constituted a legitimate intermediate category with a rational
basis.' 98 The Indiana Supreme Court in Taylor v. State' 99 conceded that the applica-
tion of the definitions might be difficult, but reached the same conclusion as the
Sorna court, which it cited approvingly. 200
Finally, but no more persuasively, critics have posited that GBMI defendants are
in the same position as defendants who were mentally ill at the time of their offense,
but who do not plead insanity. 20 ' The Michigan Court of Appeals quickly dealt with
this argument by holding that legislatures need not make every category all inclusive
and nonarbitrary.2 °2
It is unlikely that these challenges will ever be successful. Equal protection
demands not identical treatment, but only that differences bear some relevance to the
purposes of the classification. 20 3 Since GBMI involves neither a suspect classifica-
tion nor a fundamental interest, a state must meet only the lower "rational relation-
ship" standard. 20 4 The existence of both guilt and mental illness significantly dif-
192. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 55 (1973).
193. 407 Mich. 632, 663, 288 N.W.2d 909, 919 (1980).
194. People v. Sharif, 87 Mich. App. 196, 274 N.W.2d 17 (1978). The court found it reasonable for the legislature
to provide hearings only for those whom correction officials contemplated transferring. All GBMI defendants receive
evluations; the purpose of the hearing prior to transfer is to determine whether treatment would be best provided by a
mental health facility. Id. at 200-01, 274 N.W.2d at 19-20.
195. Comment, Guilty But Mentally I11, supra note 26, at 491.
196. 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979).
197. Id. at 359-60, 276 N.W.2d at 896.
198. Id. at 360, 276 N.W.2d at 896.
199. - Ind. - , 440 N.E.2d 1109 (1982).
200. Id. at- , 440 N.E.2d at 1112-13.
201. See, e.g., Comment, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 173, at 547.
202. People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. App. 244, 263 N.W.2d 44 (1977).
203. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
204. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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ferentiates people found GBMI from other groups.2 °5 It is probable that the GBMI
classification will always be found rationally to further a state's legitimate objectives
of protecting society and providing mental health treatment.
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment for-
bids disproportionate punishment for the violation of a criminal statute.20 6 Three
aspects of the GBMI verdict give rise to eighth amendment issues. First, a presently
competent person may be sentenced to a mental institution.20 7 Without a hearing to
determine the issue of present mental health, sane people may be sent to a mental
institution where they will receive unnecessary psychiatric treatment. 208 Although a
mental examination is required after trial for the purpose of sentencing, this safeguard
is insufficient since the GBMI prisoner is unable to dispute the finding.
Second, someone who is actually insane may be found GBMI and forced to
serve a prison term. 20 9 The Supreme Court has commented in dictum that the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions on a person who is mentally ill would "doubtless be
universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.' 210 While it
is true that the GBMI verdict is not aimed at imprisoning the insane, it appears
probable that because of the fine distinctions between definitions of mental illness
and insanity, people who should be found NGRI are being found GBMI. 2 11
Third, GBMI inmates will be afforded inadequate treatment and thus will be
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. 2 12 The extra security measures necessary
for the GBMI inmate will preclude him from taking advantage of the important
psychiatric treatment that is available to his civil counterpart.2 13 The Supreme Court
has held that the eighth amendment guarantees adequate medical treatment. 214 While
an individual GBMI inmate may receive inadequate treatment, this argument prob-
ably would not be enough to invalidate the statute. For, as the Michigan Supreme
Court found in McLeod,2 15 the statute provides for adequate treatment, and noncom-
pliance by the Department of Corrections cannot "render an otherwise constitutional
statute unconstitutional.' '216
4. Misapplication of GBMI
Undoubtedly, the most problematic constitutional question arises when insane
persons are found GBMI. Assuming that a constitutional right to an insanity defense
exists, this finding would unconstitutionally deprive some defendants of its use.
205. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 26, at 491.
206. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910).
207. Sherman, supra note 48, at 258.
208. Id. at 258-59.
209. Id. at 257.
210. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
211. See, e.g., Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 995.
212. Comment, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 173, at 549-50.
213. Sherman, supra note 48, at 258.
214. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
215. 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980).
216. Id. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915. A possible remedy for the individual GBMI inmate would be to apply for a writ
of mandamus to force the Department of Corrections to meet its statutory obligations. People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App.
351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979).
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Moreover, the GBMI statute may create jury confusion and encourage jury mis-
conduct. 2
17
Jury confusion can result from the subtle distinctions between legal insanity and
mental illness. 2 18 To be found GBMI, a defendant must be found mentally ill, but not
legally insane. Michigan uses a modified version of the Model Penal Code to define
insanity. "A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . . , or as a
result of mental retardation .... that person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.", 219 Mental illness is defined as "a substantial disorder of thought or
mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."' 220 While some commentators
believe these definitions are no more difficult to grasp than a reasonable man
standard, 221 a strong possibility exists that jurors may confuse insanity and mental
illness, particularly in jurisdictions where the broader Model Penal Code test is
used.2 22 The average juror lacks familiarity with the concepts of mental illness and
insanity and, therefore, the application of the definitions is more difficult than a
reasonable man test. The consequences of any error are also more severe in criminal
cases than in the civil case in which the reasonable man test is applied.
A more troubling problem arises because of jury misuse of the verdict. GBMI
may be an attractive compromise for jurors who believe that dangerous people should
be kept in custody and that a GBMI verdict will grant special treatment for the
defendant. 2 1 In reality, the verdict is substantially the same as a guilty verdict since
other statutes provide psychiatric evaluations and mental health services for all con-
victed persons. 224 A Michigan study showed that seventy-five percent of those found
GBMI are sent to prison and receive no treatment. 225 Judge Beasley of the Michigan
Court of Appeals wrote, "There is just not enough money in Michigan to give that
psychiatric treatment.' '226 A jury may decide to return the GBMI verdict without
properly applying the law to the facts. Such a decision would result in the disintegra-
tion of the insanity defense. 227
Of the constitutional challenges to GBMI, jury misapplication, whether in-
advertent or conscious, is the most compelling. Juries may find an insane defendant
GBMI as the result of either confusion or a conscious choice to ignore the law in
217. Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. R.E. 188,
195-98 (1978).
218. The Michigan Court of Appeals addressed this question in People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468,280 N.W.2d
565, leave to appeal denied, 407 Mich. 861 (1979). It concluded, rather artificially, that "a reading of the statutes refutes
defendant's arguments." Id. at 472, 280 N.W.2d at 567.
219. MicH. Cos p. lAws ANN. § 768.21a(1) (West 1982).
220. Id. § 330.1400a.
221. Comment, Insanit,-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness,
12J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 351, 375 (1979).
222. Comment, Criminal Responsibility, supra note 173, at 550 n.254.
223. Comment, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. RFs. 188,
197-98 (1978).
224. Id. at 198.
225. The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEwswEEK, May 24, 1982, at 56, 60.
226. Reforming the Insanity Defense: Five Views, STATE LEOt.stAxuEs, Oct. 1982, at 21, 25 (Judge William R.
Beasley).
227. See Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 26, at 492-93.
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order to reach a compromise verdict. The cloak of secrecy that veils jury deliberations
insulates the process from review. Thus, a defendant may easily be unconstitutionally
deprived of the insanity defense.
IV. OHIO
A. Present Law
Current Ohio law provides for pleas of guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity,
not guilty, and no contest.2 28 The test for insanity, announced in State v. Staten,229 is
similar to the Model Penal Code formulation. Ohio, however, requires total, rather
than just a substantial, lack of capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of an act.230
When the issue of insanity is introduced, the accused carries the burden of persuasion
in Ohio.23 '
Once a person is acquitted on the ground of insanity, special procedures come
into operation. 2 32 A full hearing must be conducted to determine the issue of present
mental health,233 and a defendant may be committed if he is found to be mentally ill
by clear and convincing evidence.234 When determining the nature of commitment, a
judge must use the least restrictive alternative consistent with the public safety and
welfare. 235 A conditional release may terminate no later than the expiration of the
maximum sentence a person could have served if he had been convicted. 36 Finally,
at the expiration of the sentence the prosecutor must be notified so that he may
institute civil commitment procedures.237
Ohio currently has provisions for transferring any prisoner who is mentally ill
and "subject to hospitalization by court order ' 238 to a facility operated by the
228. OHIO R. CRIM. P. II(A).
229. 18 Ohio St. 2d 13, 247 N.E.2d 293 (1969).
230. Id. at 21, 247 N.E.2d at 299. The court stated the test as follows:
In order to establish the defense of insanity, the accused must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that disease or other defect of his mind had so impaired his reason that, at the time of the criminal act with which
he is charged, either he did not know that such act was wrong or he did not have the ability to refrain from doing
that act.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
231. Id.
232. During the 113th General Assembly (1980-1981) Senate Bill No. 297 was introduced. It created a GBMI law.
Due to substantial opposition, however, the bill was redrafted to create post trial procedures for defendants found NGRI.
Diroll, Discussion of the NGRI Verdict and Michigan's "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Finding (Feb. 17, 1981) (Ohio
Legislative Service Commission).
233. OHlio REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(A) (Page 1982).
234. Id. § 2945.40(B). This is a change from the earlier requirement of "'beyond a reasonable doubt". See supra
note 232.
235. Ouro REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(D)(1) (Page 1982).
236. Id. § 2945.40(D)(6).
237. Id.
238. Id. § 5122.01(B). The statute reads:
(B) "Mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order" means a mentally ill person who,
because of his illness:
(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by evidence of threats of, or
attempts at, suicide or serious self-inflicted bodily harm;
(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as manifested by evidence of recent homicidal
or other violent behavior, evidence of recent threats that place another in reasonable fear of violent behavior and
serious physical harm, or other evidence of present dangerousness;
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Department of Mental Health for treatment. Thus, the existing law would seem to
adequately care for those who have been found guilty, but are suffering from mental
illness.
B. GBMI Proposal
The recent public clamor over the insanity defense has spurred the Ohio Legisla-
ture to consider GBMI proposals. 2 39 Ohio followed other states in modelling its
provisions after the Michigan laws, with a few major differences.
An important variation concerns the factual findings required for the proper
return of a GBMI verdict.
The Court or Jury shall not find a defendant guilty but mentally ill unless it finds all of the
following:
(1) The prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged:
(2) The defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he was suffering
from a mental illness at the time of the commission of the offense;
(3) The defendant did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not
guilty by reason of insanity of the offense. 240
These provisions reflect Ohio's decision to place the burden of proof on the defendant
when the issue of insanity is introduced. Some commentators believe this obviates
any need for the GBMI verdict.24 ' GBMI laws resulted largely from public distress
over NGRI verdicts returned in cases like the Hinckley trial.24 The result reached in
that trial would be improbable in Ohio, where the defendant, rather than the prosecu-
tion, has the burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity.
Perhaps to meet some of the constitutional objections aimed at the Michigan
statute, the Ohio Legislature has required a hearing to determine whether the person
found GBMI is presently mentally ill.24 3 Although this provision skirts some of the
(3) Represents a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical impairment or injury to himself as
manifested by evidence that he is unable to provide for and is not providing for his basic physical needs because
of his mental illness and that appropriate provision for such needs cannot be made immediately available in the
community; or
(4) Would benefit from treatment in a hospital for his mental illness and is in need of such treatment as
manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to substantial rights of others or
himself.
Id.
239. The most recent is Senate Bill No. 13, which was introduced and is still pending in the 115th General Assembly
(1983-1984), Regular Session. It is identical to Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 148, which was passed by the Senate
in the 114th General Assembly (1981-1982), Regular Session. All references in this Comment will be to S.B. 148 since
no action has yet been taken by the Senate Judiciary Committee on S.B. 13. House Bill 1005, also introduced in the 114th
General Assembly, differed from the Senate bill only in that it required certain written instructions for the jury.
240. S. 148, 114th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. § 2945.391(C) (Ohio 1981-1982).
241. See, e.g., Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 1023.
242. See e.g., Kaufman, supra note 1, at 16.
243. S. 148, 114th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. § 2945.392(B) (Ohio 1981-1982). The statute reads:
(B) Except as provided in section 2951.04 of the Revised Code, within a reasonable time after the court or
jury finds a person guilty but mentally ill, the trial court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the person is a
mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, as defined in division (B) of section 5122.01 of the
Revised Code.
Except as otherwise provided, the hearing shall be conducted pursuant to divisions (A)(1) to (5) and (A)(8)
to (15) of section 5122.15 of the Revised Code. The hearings shall be open to the public. The prosecutor shall
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due process concerns that arose in Michigan, it creates different problems. After a
finding of GBMI, the prosecutor must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused is "mentally ill subject to court-ordered hospitalization" for the defendant to
receive treatment. 2' The prosecutor, however, has no interest in succeeding.245
Unlike the NGRI acquittee, who will go free unless the prosecutor proves insanity,
the GBMI defendant will be confined, whatever the outcome of the hearing. Thus, it
is possible that the GBMI defendant will receive no treatment. If the requisite mental
illness is proved, Ohio allows the judge to commit inmates directly to the state's
mental facilities.2 46 This unique provision generated opposition from the Department
of Mental Health, which believed that the procedure would lead to inappropriate
commitments and would create immense administrative strain on the hospitals. 247
Ohio currently uses a definition of mental illness that is very similar to
Michigan's, 248 a definition likely to cause jury confusion when coupled with Ohio's
version of the Model Penal Code's insanity test. 2 49 The proposed bill, however,
utilizes a definition of insanity very similar to the M'Naghten rule. 250 All reference to
present the case demonstrating that the person found guilty but mentally ill is a mentally ill person subject to
hospitalization by court order.
If the court determines at the hearing that there is clear and convincing evidence that the person found
guilty but mentally ill is a mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, the court, after imposing
sentence pursuant to division (A) of this section, shall provide for the treatment of the person in either of the
following ways:
(1) Require the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, or the county or municipal jail or workhouse
to which the person is sentenced, to provide the necessary treatment;
(2) Commit the person for treatment and secure confinement to the Department of Mental Health for all or a
part of his sentence and require that the person, after the Department determines that he is no longer a mentally
ill person subject to hospitalization by court order, be transferred for the remainder of his sentence to the
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction or to a county or municipal jail or workhouse. The person shall be
considered a prisoner while in the custody of the Department of Mental Health.
The court shall send to the place of incarceration or commitment all reports of the mental condition of the
person found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense and at the time of commitment that were prepared
pursuant to section 2945.39 of the Revised Code and any other information the court considers relevant,
including any part of the trial transcript.
Id.
244. Id.
245. Guilty But Mentally Ill: Testimony on S.B. 148 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 114th Gen. Assy., Reg.
Sess. (1981-1982) (statements of Ann Britton, Professor of Law, C. Blake McDowell Law Center, University of Akron
(July 19, 1982), and Philip J. Resnick, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Medical College, Case Western Reserve
University (Feb. 22, 1982)).
246. S. 148, 114th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. § 2945.392(B)(2) (Ohio 1981-1982). See supra note 243.
247. Guilty But Mentally Ill: Testimony on S.B. 148 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 114th Gen. Assy., Reg.
Sess. (1981-1982) (statement by a representative of the Department of Mental Health (July 22, 1982)).
248. S. 148, 114th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. § 2945.391(D) (Ohio 1981-1982). The statute reads:
(D) As used in the Revised Code, a person is "guilty but mentally ill" if he proves by a preponderance of
the evidence that, at the time of the offense, a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or
memory grossly impaired his judgment, behavior, or his capacity to recognize reality or ability to meet the
ordinary demands of life, and that the disorder was a substantial factor contributing to the commission of the
offense.
Id.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 217-20.
250. S. 148, 114th Gen. Assy., Reg. Sess. § 2945.391(E) (Ohio 1981-82). The statute reads:
(E) As used in the Revised Code, a person is "not guilty by reason of insanity" if he proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of the criminal act, he was suffering from a mental disease or
defect that so impaired his reason that he did not know that his act was wrong.
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a volitional component has been removed. While the deletion may make the confu-
sion over terms less likely, it greatly reduces the number of people who may be found
NGRI. Thus, the object of the bill is all too apparent: it is aimed at vastly enlarging
the number of people who may be held criminally responsible for their offenses
despite their mental state. Any therapeutic purpose is belied since no more treatment
is guaranteed than is currently available to prisoners by virtue of section 5120.17 of
the Ohio Revised Code. 25 1
Ohio has a special problem with the plea of GBMI.25 2 Article IV, section 5(B),
of the Ohio Constitution grants the Ohio Supreme Court authority to prescribe rules
governing practice and procedure in all courts. Pursuant to this power, it has pro-
mulgated the pleas available in criminal cases. They do not include GBMI.25 3
Although it may be argued that pleas affect substantive rights, the supreme court may
reject the proposed plea as an unconstitutional legislative usurpation of judicial au-
thority.
2 5 4
V. THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GBMI AND
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The guilty but mentally ill verdict is a poor choice for states seeking the reform
of the insanity defense. Although it purportedly aims to provide psychiatric treatment
to those mentally ill defendants who would otherwise be found guilty, on examina-
tion the results of the application of GBMI are quite different. It is but a thinly veiled
disguise for the abolition of the insanity defense. Legislatures, fearing the con-
stitutional morass of a straightforward repeal of the defense, attempt to reach the
same result by creating the GBMI verdict. The real purpose of the law is not treat-
ment but commitment. State legislatures pass the law while fully aware that they will
be financially unable to provide adequate treatment. For example, Georgia specifical-
ly limits treatment to that "within the limits of state funds appropriated therefor. "255
Furthermore, most states, like Ohio, already have statutes that provide for the transfer
of mentally ill prisoners to mental hospitals. Particularly telling is the narrowing of
the scope of the insanity defense, the only possible reason for which would be to
broaden the range of persons who may be held criminally responsible for their acts.
Theoretical objections aside, GBMI laws are beset with constitutional and prac-
tical problems. Failure to provide a hearing to determine present mental health raises
legitimate due process concerns. The inadequacy of treatment that results from
GBMI, if not violative of eighth amendment rights, at least demonstrates the capabil-
ity problem. At present, states have neither the resources nor the funds to provide the
treatment they seem to be promising. Additionally, juries may be misled by the law's
251. Guilty But Mentally Ill: Testimony on S.B. 148 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 114th Gen. Assy., Reg.
Sess. (1981-1982) (statement by Carol King, Staff Attorney, Ohio Legal Rights Service (July 19, 1982)).
252. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114th GEN. Assy., REG. SEsS., REPORT ON SUB. S. 148 (March
12, 1981).
253. OHIO R. CRma. P. 11(A).
254. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114th GEN. Assy., REO. SEss., REPORT ON SUB. S. 148 (March
12, 1981).
255. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1982).
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hypocrisy and be tempted to use GBMI as a compromise in an effort to secure
specialized treatment for a defendant while at the same time guaranteeing commit-
ment. Even if jury abuse does not occur, the similarities between definitions of
insanity and mental illness make it likely that some insane defendants will be im-
prisoned. The result is the same: defendants are deprived of the insanity defense.
Legislatures considering GBMI should reject it as a simplistic solution to a
complex problem. They should critically examine the motivation behind the creation
of GBMI. One of the problems that directly led to the law's enactment was the
"revolving door" aspect of NGRI-the fear that acquittees would be "back on the
street" in a short time. Legislatures should address this problem directly.
At trial some alleviative measures could be taken. First, jury instructions on
NGRI could be made clearer.256 To overcome undue reliance on psychiatric testi-
mony, the jury should be given detailed instructions specifying that they are the
ultimate factfinders. Special verdicts, rather than general, would guarantee that the
jury truly understood the standard that it was to apply. Second, and crucial to the
resolution of the revolving door problem, the burden of persuasion should be placed
on the defendant.257 This would remedy a notable procedural anomaly. Under current
procedure the prosecution has the burden of proving a defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial and, if acquitted, his mental illness by a lower standard at a
civil commitment hearing. A NGRI acquittee may be prematurely released if the
prosecution fails to prove either.
After a NGRI acquittee has been committed, release standards should be tight-
ened. Psychiatrists and courts differ on the requirements for continued commitment,
as evidenced by Michigan's post-McQuillan experience.2 8 Presently, acquittees may
be released although they are still afflicted with the condition that resulted in the
acquittal. 259 Requiring that the release of an NGRI acquittee be conditioned on the
facts that first led to the acquittal and initial commitment would be a solution.
The insanity defense is a fundamental part of the criminal justice system, and its
reform should not be undertaken without careful deliberation. The GBMI plea and
verdict assuage public concerns by subverting the defense. While at first glance the
law is appealing, on further consideration its problems and objectionable purposes
become apparent. The GBMI alternative should be rejected and legislative energies
directed toward more equitable and productive changes in the procedures governing
NGRI acquittees.
Judith A. Northrup
256. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 19.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 28-46.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 144-55.
259. Note, Revolving Door, supra note 30, at 974-75.
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